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MILITARY MANAGERS IN THE JOINT MILITARY-CIVIL SERVICE ORGANIZATION

RAYMOND E. PAULSEN

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MILITARY MANAGERS IN THE JOINT MILITARY-CIVIL SERVICE ORGANIZATION

* * * * *

Raymond E. Paulsen

MILITARY MANAGERS IN THE JOINT MILITARY-CIVIL SERVICE ORGANIZATION

by

Raymond E. Paulsen

Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps

United States Navy

Submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
MANAGEMENT

United States Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

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by

Raymond E. Paulsen

This work is accepted as fulfilling
the research paper requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN

MANAGEMENT

from the

United States Naval Postgraduate School

ABSTRACT

The military manager has many and varied problems. The paper investigates some of the management problems and personnel conflicts that exist in a joint military-civil service organization; reviews the literature on how a manager in any organization handles similar problems; covers information obtained by questionnaires from senior naval officers and senior civil service employees on these issues; and, summarizes the information and draws conclusions for the purpose of assisting naval officers in better understanding these problems and in developing more effective management techniques and procedures to deal with them. Even though the investigation and conclusions apply, in general, to any joint military-civil service organization; primary interest is in Navy organizations where Civil Engineer Corps Officers supervise civil service employees.

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CHAPTER I

PROBLEMS FACING A MILITARY MANAGER IN A JOINT MILITARY-CIVIL SERVICE ORGANIZATION

Introduction

The purpose of this research paper is to: (a) investigate some of the management problems and personnel conflicts that exist in a joint military-civil service organization; (b) review the literature on how a manager or supervisor in any organization handles similar problems; (c) obtain first hand information from senior naval officers and senior civil service employees on these issues; and, (d) summarize the information in hopes that conclusions can be reached that will assist naval officers in better understanding these problems and in developing more effective management techniques and procedures to deal with them. Even though the investigation and conclusions of this paper will apply, in general, to any joint military-civil service organization, primary interest will be in Navy organizations where Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) Officers are supervising civil service employees.

Considerable material has been written on leadership, management, military organizations and civil service; however, very little appears to have been written on the problems of management of the joint military-civil service organization. Particularly at the level of department and division heads at a field activity which is the area to be covered by this paper.

For the purpose of this paper managers, executives and supervisors are considered synonymous terms and will be used interchangeably.

Role of Naval Officer in The Shore Establishment.

In the early years of our Navy, the Naval Officer was strictly a sea-going man and shore duties were handled by civilians. The many changes in the size, type and complexities of our ships, as well as the increasing importance of the supporting and technological aspects of warfare, have resulted in a tremendous expansion of both the shore and fleet organizations of the Navy. As the naval establishment becomes progressively dependent on complex technology, the importance of the military manager increases.

> The new tasks of the military require that the professional officer develop more and more of the skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders. . . . the military commander must become more interested and more skilled in techniques of organization, in the management of morale and negotiation.[1]

Military-Civilian Relations

The problems of the military manager in the joint military-civil service organization are complicated by one factor not common elsewhere; he must manage his single workforce in a common mission under at least two different personnel and career systems. His civil service personnel must be managed under the Federal civil service system and his officers and enlisted men must be managed under a military system. Individual and group goals, motives, values and incentives tend to be different in each system.

> The career system of the officer is, historically, an older form of social organization, in which the maintenance of a rigid structure of authority is necessarily a prime consideration. The individual entering such a system surrenders certain personal liberties, and in return he receives certain advantages. He becomes a member of a social system with relatively clearly defined roles,

> and with a relatively heavy emphasis on the prerogatives of status. He is rewarded by the prestige, diversity, training, glamour, security, etc., attendant to this career system. He is carefully indoctrinated in military tradition. This point needs no further elaboration. Such a career has evident significant differences from the typical civilian professional career, which occurs in a more democratic and individualistic environment.[2]

The second Hoover Commission indicated one of the reasons for conflicts between military and civilian personnel.

> The unique personnel problem of the Department of Defense is that military and civilian personnel are working together without clear delineation of the role appropriate to each.[3]

Many military personnel that have been assigned to a strictly military organization earnestly feel that there are no civilians in the Navy. However, every civil service employee that works for the Department of the Navy is a member of the Navy team. Others accept the fact that civilians are on the Navy team but consider them on the second or third team rather than on the varsity. This is a symptom of some of the problems that exist in the relationship of military and civilians in the Navy organization.

> To reach maximum effectiveness, the total workforce, uniformed and civilian, must be regarded as an entity and managed as an entity. Whether a man is wearing a uniform or civilian clothes, he works for the same organization and has equal responsibility for the achievement of its objectives.[4]

A source of irritation between the military and civilians is the tendency of the military (transients) to complain about the local weather, taxes, schools, living costs, traffic, housing, lack of hospitality and various facilities to the permanent or semi-permanent resident civil servants.

Whenever two different groups with similar functions are working side by side in the same organization, friction and competition for power, prestige and recognition will develop. Each group will tend to become more cohesive to protect its benefits and seek other advantages. The difference of the rank or pay systems is a source of irritation to both the military and civil service employees. The military rank or pay is person oriented. He is paid the same no matter what job he is doing; whereas, the civil service is position oriented with pay and rating based on position.

> The most common gripe heard from members of the armed forces and the civil servants working for defense are the inequalities of the systems whereby different persons get different ranks, grades, and pay for doing the same job.[5]

The present role of the officer in the shore organization is generally as a manager and a responsible representative of the operating forces. He can provide valuable first hand information on the material needs of the operating forces. Whereas, the primary function of the civilian group is to provide the engineering and scientific experience as well as continuity in the organization.

Position of Junior Officer In the Organization

In nearly all cases, officers have been given management responsibility for their particular military-civilian organization. In some cases, junior officers are placed in positions where they supervise older, more experienced, civilian personnel. This causes friction in the organization. Resentment is not so much caused by difference in age, but rather lack of experience. This problem is minimized by the officer

who recognizes his limitations, acknowledges the experience of the civil servant, and uses that valuable experience and talent.

The problem arises because of the military manager's dual responsibility for the executive development of the junior officer and maintaining an efficient and effective organization. He has a choice of placing him either in the line organization or in a staff capacity. When he is placed in the chain of command the efficiency of the organization may be lowered by resentment and lack of cooperation by the older, more experienced civilians; however, the junior officer will receive valuable training in supervisory functions and should develop the capability to assume greater responsibilities quicker than he would in a staff capacity.

Since the civilians are supervised by officers and thereby occupy subordinate positions, there are many times that they do not receive proper recognition. The professional civilians are treated somewhat like warrant officers, neither officer nor enlisted. There are numerous situations which tend to indicate the difference in status levels that some hold for officers and their civilian counterparts. An example that most people have observed is that of listing the names of persons attending a conference by listing the names of all officers, in order of descending rank, before listing the names of civilians, regardless of rating.

Rotation Of Officers and Effects On Organization

One difference in the two groups is the frequent rotation of officers and the relative stability of civilian assignments. This creates problems but has several advantages. The rotation of officers through positions of responsibility, supplemented with advanced education, tends to develop

individuals who are qualified for top level and managerial positions. Some resentment is built up in the civilians as a result of this situation. Most of the top positions are occupied by officers and opportunities for individual development and growth of the civilians has been somewhat limited.

Although the frequent rotation of officers is good experience and helps the individual develop, it adversely affects the efficiency of the organization. Even though he may be a competent officer, the learning time required for him to be a competent manager of the new organization may be in excess of one year. In the meantime, he is in danger of hindering the work, irritating his subordinates and exposing his ignorance by making judgments and decisions which he is not at that point qualified to make. Until he learns the competence of his staff, he does not know whom he can trust or how much faith to put in their recommendations. This tends to slow progress and limits the delegation of responsibility to appropriate levels. Another problem that may develop is the failure of the rotating manager to develop an adequate feeling for long range planning. He may be inclined to make decisions on the basis of what is good for the organization now and give no consideration to the long range effect of the decision. He seldom has the important motivational satisfaction of "seeing a job through".

Although the civilian side of the organization is supposed to provide continuity, the different policies and procedures of each new officer keeps the organization pretty turbulent. Changes are sometimes made by incoming officers because of past methods of operating even though existing methods might be just as effective.

Lack of communication up and down causes many irritations between the civilians and the military. If an officer does not pass essential information to his senior civilian supervisors, how can they provide the continuity that is urgently needed in this type of an organization? Communications within the military and within civilian groups are normally satisfactory; however, the inter-communications between the groups is deficient in many organizations. Officers can make a valuable contribution in bringing their know-how and experience to a new organization and making it available to their personnel.

Summary

The problems that face the military manager are many and varied. Like any manager, he must be concerned with the selection, assignment, development and motivation of his personnel. In addition, he must manage his personnel under two different systems. The individual and group goals, motives, values and incentives tend to be different for the military and civil service personnel.

Added pressure is put on the military manager by the frequent rotation of officers. He must learn the capabilities of his personnel quickly if he is to run his organization effectively. One problem that frequently faces the military manager is the placement of junior officers in the joint military-civil service organization. He has the responsibility for the training and development of the junior officer and for running an efficient and effective organization. Sometimes these two responsibilities do not go hand-in-hand because conflicts develop between the junior officer and the civil service personnel that he supervises.

In order for the military-civilian organization to function efficiently, it must be integrated into a working entity. There must be mutual understanding, trust and confidence. Unfortunately, there are many things that impede the achievement of this utopia.

CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

1. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 9.

2. J. K. Fordyce, "Officer-Civilian Relationships in Semi-Military Technical Organizations", Journal of The American Society of Naval Engineers, Inc., LXV, No. 1 (February, 1953), p.11.

3. U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 45.

4. LTGEN James F. Collins, "Military Managers and Civilian Personnel," Army Information Digest, XIV (January, 1959), p.22.

5. J. H. Wagner, "DOD's Greatest Unsolved Problem: People," Armed Forces Management, VIII (May, 1962), p.13.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON PROBLEMS OF A MANAGER AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES IN HANDLING THOSE PROBLEMS

Introduction

The premise used in reviewing the literature was that the general nature and types of problems facing a military manager are not radically different from the problems facing a manager or supervisor in any organization. In both cases the manager is dealing with individuals and to be effective he must treat them as individuals. Practices or methods which are appropriate for dealing with individuals with one set of personality characteristics may be entirely inappropriate for others.[1] This will hold true whether the individuals are civilian, military, protestant, catholic, male or female. To be an effective supervisor, an individual must develop the ability to: analyze the desires, motives and goals of individuals and groups; communicate effectively with subordinates, peers and superiors; and, motivate individuals and groups to accomplish organizational goals. It is intended to review some of the procedures, techniques and methods used by effective supervisors and to present that information so that a conscientious military manager can use it to improve his effectiveness in working with individuals, be they military or civilian.

Motivation, Reward and Discipline

A manager would be wise to make use of the information contained in a statement by Fred Korth when he was Secretary of the Navy.

> A person's motivation is strong when his talents are recognized, he is encouraged to use them, and he is recognized for a good performance. Conversely, he is frustrated when misplaced, when his talents are wasted, or when recognition centers on his mistakes rather than his accomplishments.[2]

Supervisors tend to admonish or discipline subordinates more than they praise or reward them. They may not intend to do this or even be aware that they are doing it. There is usually an incident that calls the attention of the supervisor to something gone wrong; however, when things are going right, many exceptional accomplishments are taken for granted. A good supervisor will be alert for above average performance and insure that the individual receives proper recognition.

Formal and Informal Organizations and Initiating Changes

Managers who are concerned about building organizations that will operate effectively and also provide individuals with satisfying activities need to recognize that the process is a continuous one. The task is never complete and the results are never perfect. No one organization plan will solve the problem once and for all. The manager must take the human factors into consideration in all his actions and decisions. Thus time, patience, and awareness become the major ingredients of the administrative process.[3]

The chain of command of the authoritarian military organization has been traditionally shown on an organization chart. A new officer reporting for duty in an organization is supposed to be able to look at the organization chart and understand to whom he reports, who reports to him and exactly how the organization functions. Organization charts are useful and can assist new members in getting an overall picture of the

organization; however, they should not accept the chart as being the gospel. It is impossible to show the many and varied relationships of individuals and groups on a two-dimensional chart. Furthermore, these relations are continually changing. The organization chart does not show informal organizations. An effective manager must recognize the fact that:

> Informal organizations are found within all formal organizations, the latter being essential to order and consistency, the former to vitality.[4]

Informal groups are formed for various reasons and is a topic worthy of a complete book. For the purpose of this paper we are not overly concerned as to why they exist, although that information could be useful, but how they can be used for the good of the organization. A supervisor can use the informal organization's channels of communication to gain acceptance of new ideas, use the leaders of informal groups and use the individual's loyalty to his group to further organizational goals.

> The tasks of overcoming resistance to change and deciding how to introduce changes centers largely in the company's informal work groups.[5]

Organizations are not static and they must change to keep pace with progress in the world. In the joint military-civil service organization changes are prevalent. The frequent rotation of officers is one of the causes of many changes being initiated. Some of these changes are good and are accepted, some are good but are not accepted by the organization and some are made solely because of past methods of operation of the officer and do not improve the efficiency of the organization. This

is an area covered in the opinion pole of officers and civilians described in Chapters III and IV.

Before any manager initiates a change, he should ask himself these questions. Should any change at all be made? Is this kind of a change proper? Is the time for the change right?

Change may mean excitement, challenge, opportunities for self-actualization and development, or change may mean frustration, insecurity, or loss of social status and self-esteem. People expect changes to be planned with the individual in mind. They feel that their rights as human beings should outweigh any impersonal organizational objectives. Considerable thought and planning should precede any significant change in an organization.

Rotation of Officers and Effects on the Organization

The frequent rotation of officers has previously been mentioned as a problem in the joint military-civil service organization. The Hoover Commission Report indicated that:

> The tenure of officer personnel in support activities is generally too short to provide either efficient management or effective training.
>
> The principal faults of present officer assignment practices are these:
>
> 1. An officer does not have a chance to learn an assignment before he is moved on to the next one.
>
> 2. The excessive rotation practices are a hardship on the officer and his family.
>
> 3. The excessive rotation practices are a hardship on the civilians who must maintain the continuity in the support activities and must instruct the new officers in their work.

> 4. Efficiency of the support activities suffers because of lost time involved in making the transition from one officer to the next and problems of long-term motivation because of sustained tenure.
>
> 5. It is an expensive practice - counting training costs, lost time, and moving and travel costs.
>
> Rotation is very effective as a developmental device and is commonly used in business and industry for the development of top-level executive talent. But it is unrealistic to assume that the assignment of officers to support activities for exceedingly short periods of time either constitutes training or is of benefit to the support activities.[6]

Although ten years have passed since the Hoover Commission Report was submitted to Congress, the same faults exist in today's officer assignment practices.

The short tours of duty require the military manager to assess the capabilities of his personnel in a short period of time if he is going to be successful. Sometimes he may become aware of an incompetent civilian late in his tour of duty and be unable to have him removed before he is transferred. The next officer may want to get first hand information before he takes any action; consequently, some incompetents are retained in positions longer than they should be. This affects the attitude of many people in the organization. LT. GENERAL Collins has some good advice on this matter. He states that:

> Much of our difficulty in respect to eliminating non-productive civilians is caused by our own lack of knowledge of proper procedures. Laws and regulations are, of course, in effect to protect the rights of individuals from capricious action on the part of their supervisors; but these rules are not designed to perpetuate the inefficient in their jobs. . . . Correct application of regulations and procedures can make the management of the civilian segment an orderly, sensible matter, not solely in respect to elimination action but also for promotions, transfers and other personal management activities.[7]

The rotation of officers, length of their tours of duty and resulting effects on the organization is an area of interest on the questionnaire distributed to officers and civil service employees discussed in Chapters III and IV.

Communications

One of the biggest problems any supervisor has is that of effectively communicating with his superiors, peers and subordinates.

> It is from this cause that there arises a great area of confusion, frustration and conflict in the function of management. How often have you left a conference with a definite idea of the decision made, only to find out later that others left with just as definite an idea, but an entirely different one as to the decision made? This occurs frequently and is one of the contributing reasons why the Job of the Executive is a difficult one.[8]

Much has been written on effective communications, but a thorough coverage of that subject is not considered appropriate in this paper. However, a supervisor should be aware of this problem and should continually strive to improve his ability to communicate with others.

Integration of the Junior Officer in the Organization

The problem of integrating the junior officer in the joint military-civil service organization was discussed briefly in Chapter I. He can be placed in the line organization or in a staff capacity. When he is working in a staff position, he has the opportunity to work with people throughout the organization on a variety of tasks. He can obtain useful knowledge on how the various branches of the organization function and valuable experience on how to accomplish desired goals by using persuasion and influence. He will experience frustration and disappointment working in this type of a position. Conflicts develop between line and staff

personnel in any organization and he has the added problem of being younger than the people with whom he is working.

> The older line officers disliked receiving what they regarded as instruction from men so much younger than themselves, and staff personnel clearly were conscious of this attitude among line officers. In staff-line meetings staff officers frequently had their ideas slighted or even treated with amusement by line incumbents. . . . The young staff officer learned that (1) his freedom to function was snared in a web of informal commitments; (2) his academic specialty (on which he leaned for support in his new position) was often not relevant for carrying out his formal assignments; and that (3) the important thing to do was to learn who the informally powerful line officers were and what ideas they would welcome which at the same time would be acceptable to his superiors.[9]

When the junior officer is placed in a line position he will be faced with supervising older more experienced personnel. The authority of his position will not solve all the problems that exists for the junior officer in a line position. He must gain acceptance of his ideas and decisions and this will require persuasion and influence. Senior officers can give valuable assistance in providing on-the-job training in how to set goals, create ideas for achieving these goals, making decisions, gaining acceptance of their decisions, and putting their decisions into effect. Senior civil service employees can provide valuable assistance and training to junior officers if they are given the chance. Although formal training is an important factor in executive development, experience molds the final product and gives the junior officer a chance to prove that he can make the grade.

The problem of integrating a junior officer into the joint military-civil service organization is an area of interest in the questionnaire discussed in Chapter III and IV.

Decision Making and Delegation of Authority

One of the primary duties of any manager is to make decisions. The thing that separates the men from the boys in decision making is not only the quality of decisions made but the ability to know when and when not to make a decision, whether he or someone else should make the decision, and how to get it accepted.

Every manager or supervisor should work to improve his ability to make decisions.

> An understanding of the personal goals of our associates, subordinates, and superiors, and those of the men in other groups in the organization whose cooperation must be secured, enable us to make better company decisions.[10]

Supervisors should seek better ways of getting their decisions accepted. The acceptance is just as important to the welfare of the organization as making the decision in the first place. Unless a supervisor can induce others to accept and act on his decisions, all his efforts in making wise ones are wasted.

Sometimes a decision can be not to make a decision.

> Not to make decisions that cannot be made effective is to refrain from destroying authority. Not to make decisions that others should make is to preserve morale, to develop competence, to fix responsibility, and to preserve authority.[11]

Many managers complain that they are overworked and do not have time to do their job right. In some cases this condition may be beyond their control; however, in most of the cases the workload could be reduced considerably if they would delegate some of the work to capable subordinates.

> Executives are often more reluctant to delegate than they themselves will admit. Perhaps the most common problem in this respect is the failure to delegate responsibility over relatively minor matters. Far too many executives clutter their desks and minds with details that could be handled by a literate office boy.[12]

Some of the reasons why a manager is reluctant to delegate work are:

1. He feels he can do the job better.
2. He feels that he can do the job in less time than it takes to explain it to someone else.
3. He lacks the ability to direct the efforts of others.
4. He lacks confidence in his subordinates.
5. He is afraid to take a chance.
6. He lacks control measures that will give him a warning of impending difficulties.
7. He feels that he must make the decisions for his organization.

Delegation of authority to capable subordinates and getting participation from them on items that are of major concern to them, improves the morale and efficiency of the organization. Jones summarized the advantages of delegating authority for decision making to subordinates:

> (1) places decision making in the hands of those most likely to have available the needed factual and value premise; (2) gives young executives experience, and thus trains them for bigger tasks and strengthens their confidence in themselves; (3) provides a channel and an outlet for the men's creative drives; and (4) makes more time available to top executives for thinking and planning, once the men down in the organization are trained.[13]

Decision making and delegation by the junior officer is an area of interest in the questionnaire discussed in Chapters III and IV.

Education and Training of Subordinates

The training and educational programs available to military personnel are quite extensive; whereas, those available to civil service employees have been somewhat limited. Recent trends of increased government support encourages greater civilian participation in training and educational programs. Military managers should encourage individual development as well as education and training for improving the organization. He should develop an atmosphere in the organization that not only will permit but encourage the use of new techniques and information gained in educational programs. Most people in a military-civilian organization have observed the annihilation of new ideas and initiative simply because of a supervisor's education or resistance to change.

> . . . the executive not only has the authority and responsibility of safe-guarding and enhancing the abilities of his associates and those who serve under him, but a golden opportunity as well. He may educate and inspire men to a realization of their highest capacity and personal satisfaction.[14]

What Makes An Effective Supervisor?

An effective supervisor must recognize the fact that individuals differ, both military and civilian, and he must take these differences into consideration and try and run his organization in an effective and efficient manner based upon his knowledge and judgment of the individual. He must assume his duties with tact, firmness, fairness, and a healthy attitude to perform to the best of his abilities while at all times maximizing the use of the talents of all those working for him.

In the joint military-civil service organization, officers are placed in supervisory positions over civilians. If the officer wants to have an effective organization and satisfactory relations with the civil service employees, he must become a good supervisor. The requirements for a good supervisor are basically the same in any organization. He must be effective not only with his own subordinates, but also with his peers and his own superiors.

Let us examine the fifteen characteristics of an effective supervisor discussed by Nigro.[15] These same characteristics are used in the questionnaire discussed in Chapters III and IV and should be of considerable interest to junior officers.

He satisfies the employee's desire for recognition. He appreciates that the worker wants to feel important. He puts himself in the subordinate's shoes and tries to see things from the employee's point of view. He understands that the worker wants recognition not only as an individual, but also as a member of the organization. A worker's motivation is strong when his talents are recognized and he is encouraged to use them.

He keeps his employees properly informed. He does not withhold information which is needed by the employee in order to do his job efficiently. He does not resent being asked questions. He advises them of management policies about which they are interested. There is certain information that is confidential and should not be made common knowledge and there is a limit to how much information should be passed on to the employees. Each supervisor will have to decide where he is going to draw

the line. The tendency has been to pass on too little information rather than too much. He disseminates facts that will tend to make rumors unnecessary.

The effective supervisor allows the subordinate to exercise his own discretion and to make as many decisions on his own as he can. This is probably the most difficult principle for an officer to follow. By changing assignments every two to three years, he spends about one-third of his time learning the capabilities and limitations of the employees in the organizations. As head of a division or department, he is responsible for all decisions within his organization and he is reluctant to delegate authority to make decisions to individuals until he knows their capabilities. Senior officers are more capable in coping with this situation than junior officers. Other conditions that might cause a supervisor to fail to delegate are:

1. The supervisor may be a perfectionist who is unwilling to trust details to others.
2. He may feel that no one else can do this job as well as he can.
3. Self confidence may be lacking. He may be afraid of mistakes, embarrassment, or encroachment upon his prestige.

The good supervisor does not invade the bailiwick of the specialist. There are situations where very few officers are qualified in the technical area under consideration and therefore, are not qualified on the technical aspects of the work. Officers that supervise specialists must delegate

the authority for the technical aspects and provide only general supervision, coordination and administration.

The effective supervisor keeps his door open for conferences and consultations with his subordinates. When a supervisor does not have sufficient time to have a completely open door policy, he must budget his time so that his assistants can see him on problems they consider important. If he has properly delegated the work of the organization, he will have more time to discuss problems with subordinates. It may be necessary for him to educate some of his subordinates if they make too many demands on his time. He must remember that it is frustrating for anyone to not be able to see his superior when he has a problem to discuss. Supervisors must be available to hear subordinates' problems if they expect any information to flow up from the organization.

> One of the most effective methods for uncovering the goals of a man, and thus his probable reaction to a new alternative, is the simple art of listening instead of talking - listening with the eyes as well as the ears. We often become so engrossed in ourselves and our own ideas that we do all the talking and forget that, as an executive, one of our tasks is to learn what other men think.[16]

The courageous supervisor accepts the probability of being unpopular with at least some of his subordinates. Supervisors should face the fact that they are not in a popularity contest but are running a business that requires them to deal firmly with problems. Investigations conducted by Fiedler indicated that an attribute that makes a leader more effective is that he

> . . . must maintain a certain amount of psychological distance from his men, and especially from his key subordinates. That is, he must be willing to reject

> co-workers who do not adequately perform their jobs. This requires emotional independence and detachment from others. The person who readily forms deep emotional ties with his subordinates, who needs to be liked and supported by his men, will find it difficult to discipline or to discharge them since this may decrease his popularity or cause him to lose their friendship.[17]

The wise supervisor will consult with his subordinates before making decisions that affect them, but he must keep in mind the best interests of the organization.

> Supervisors avoid unpleasant personnel tasks. If the finger had to be placed upon a single weakness upon the part of line officials performing their personnel jobs, it would be on their unwillingness to face up to unpleasant personnel tasks, to face the realities of personnel situations even when the facts are known.[18]

Supervisors should bring problems out into the open, and settle disputes with face to face discussions whenever possible. Written communications should never be used to keep from facing an unpleasant task. Many problems should be handled by staff counselers but the majority of the problems can and should be handled by the line supervisor.

The realistic supervisor is not unduly optimistic about the state of the morale of the employees and other conditions within the organization for which he is responsible. Often the supervisor sincerely believes that all is going well in the organization when in fact it is not. One of the reasons for this is that subordinates often tell their supervisor what they think he wants to know. In other words, the information flowing upward is deficient. He is not necessarily told a lie but is not given sufficient information to see the whole picture.

> The chances are against the executive's obtaining all the facts even if he pleads for them. This is especially true if the employees believe the facts will show that the boss has been wrong.[19]

The development of mutual confidence and respect between the supervisor and his subordinates can improve this situation considerably. The naval officer on a short tour will have difficulty getting all the facts. He should get to know his people and their capabilities as soon as possible.

The sophisticated supervisor sees to it that his assistant chiefs properly interpret and execute his orders. This applies to the supervisor who has supervisors through whom he transmits instructions to the rest of the organization. It does not apply to first-line supervisors. Subordinate supervisors have a tendency to interpret and modify instructions or orders as they pass them down the line. Their work should be reviewed just like any other person in the organization. They should be able to make decisions on their own but should not have unlimited discretion. A supervisor should not assume that orders will be carried out without some checking. Proper control and feedback is essential in any organization.

The flexible minded supervisor tries to obtain changes in regulations which in practice do not achieve their intended results. There is a tremendous need for this type of action in Navy organizations. Every day there are new rules, regulations and instructions promulgated. Some of them should never have been issued as such; however, most of them serve the purpose for which they were intended. In time, many of them should be revised and others cancelled. This is done but the process is slow. A good supervisor will be alert for regulations that need to be changed and will take steps to get them changed. Arbitrarily enforcing

rules that are not serving any useful purpose or simply ignoring them will result in a deterioration of morale and respect for authority.

> There is no principle of executive conduct better established in good organizations than that orders will not be issued that cannot or will not be obeyed. Executives and most persons of experience who have thought about it know that to do so destroys authority, discipline and morale.[20]

The well-balanced supervisor accepts the possibility, indeed the probability, that some of his subordinates may be more intelligent or more talented than he is. Some supervisors feel that they must impress everyone that they are superior in every way to their subordinates. They have a fear of being shown up. In the present technological age, many supervisors will have subordinates in different technical specialties that will know more about their specialty than their supervisor. The supervisor needs good judgment and the ability to coordinate the efforts of his people and should not worry about being inferior. This might be a problem for junior officers that are put in charge of older, more experienced civilians. As a supervisor progresses up the ladder, he will find less requirements for technical knowledge and more requirements for general knowledge.

The thoughtful supervisor will not make promises to his subordinates unless he is sure that he can fulfill them. Supervisors should not be too optimistic when making promises, particularly when the promise depends on others for concurrence and/or action.

The fair-minded supervisor will not only expect loyalty from his employees but will also be loyal to them. Loyalty is a two-way street.

The development of mutual respect and trust and guarding against degrading comments to others will promote good working relations.

The well-liked supervisor neither favors nor discriminates against his personal friends. The merit principle should be the controlling factor. Being friendly with one's subordinates can promote good working relations; however, the supervisor should continually be mindful not to show favoritism.

The firm supervisor will not give in to employees simply because he wearies of the pressure the latter exert. The old saying "the squeaking wheel gets the grease" is sometimes true in supervisor-subordinate relations. If a supervisor gives in to an employee simply because he is tired of being bothered, he will loose the respect of other subordinates. He must be fair and give equal treatment to all his subordinates.

The supervisor should fight in the interests of his subordinates just as hard as his conscience permits. Within an organization, all employees should be treated uniformly. When some division receives more privileges or receives better treatment because of the actions of their supervisor, personnel in other divisions feel that they should receive equal treatment and they feel that their supervisor has let them down. If a supervisor has a reason why his subordinates should not receive the same advantages as others in the organization, he should make an attempt to explain the reason to his subordinates.

The preceding principles make it clear that one must exert considerable time and effort to become an effective supervisor. If an

officer wants to improve relations with the civilians he supervises, the most important step he can take is to become an effective supervisor. He would be wise to follow the principles of "The Ten Commandments of Good Organization" that were prepared by the American Management Association for the guidance of persons active in the field of organization and management as listed below.[21]

1. Definite and clean-cut responsibilities should be assigned to each executive.

2. Responsibility should always be coupled with corresponding authority.

3. No change should be made in the scope or responsibilities of a position without a definite understanding to that effect on the part of all persons concerned.

4. No executive or employee, occupying a single position in the organization, should be subject to definite orders from more than one source.

5. Orders should never be given to subordinates over the head of a responsible executive. Rather than do this the officer in question should be supplanted.

6. Criticisms of subordinates should, whenever possible, be made privately, and in no case should a subordinate be criticized in the presence of executives or employees of equal or lower rank.

7. No dispute or difference between executives or employees as to authority or responsibilities should be considered too trivial for prompt and careful adjudication.

8. Promotions, wage changes, and disciplinary action should always be approved by the executive immediately superior to the one directly responsible.

9. No executive or employee should ever be required, or expected, to be at the same time an assistant to, and critic of, another.

10. Any executive whose work is subject to regular inspection should, whenever practicable, be given the assistance and facilities necessary to enable him to maintain an independent check of the quality of his work.

Summary

To be an effective supervisor, an individual must develop the ability to: analyze the desires, motives and goals of individuals and groups; communicate effectively with subordinates, peers and superiors; and, motivate individuals and groups to accomplish organizational goals. Supervisors should be alert for good performances by their subordinates and insure that individuals receive recognition for their efforts. Praise and recognition for exceptional accomplishments can be a strong motivator for the organization as well as for individuals.

Informal organizations exist within all formal organizations. An alert supervisor recognizes this fact and uses the informal organization's channels of communication to gain acceptance of new ideas and changes.

Organizations are frequently changing to keep pace with progress. Managers should consider the effect of any change on the overall efficiency of the organization as well as on the individuals in the organization. He should ask himself these questions before initiating a change. Should any change at all be made? Is this kind of a change proper? Is the time for the change right? Considerable thought and planning should precede any significant change in an organization.

The rotation of officers in the joint military-civil service organization is considered to be too frequent for either efficient management or effective training. The officer does not have sufficient time to learn his new assignment and the capabilities of his personnel before he is moved to his next assignment. The civil servants are required to maintain continuity in the organization; however this task

is extremely difficult when the people to whom they report are continually changing.

The role of the junior officer in the joint military-civil service organization is one of concern to both military and civilian supervisors. In order for him to develop the capability to assume position of high responsibility in the organization, he must learn how the organization functions, develop the ability to make good decisions, gain acceptance of his decisions, and obtain experience in handling supervisory problems. He can be placed in either a staff or a line position. He can get valuable training in each but sooner or later he must have experience in a line position. Problems develop in both cases; however, they can be minimized with the assistance of senior officers in an on-the-job training program.

Decision making is a primary function of any manager; however, he should not make all the decisions for his organization. He should get participation from subordinates and in many cases, should delegate the authority for making decisions to capable subordinate supervisors.

The military manager should develop an atmosphere in the organization that will encourage individual development and efficiency. He should assume his duties with tact, firmness, fairness, and a healthy attitude to perform to the best of his ability while at all times maximizing the use of the talents of those working for him.

CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES

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19. Chris Argyris, "Human Relations in a Bank," Harvard Business Review, XXXII, No. 5 (September-October, 1954), p. 72.

20. Barnard, op. cit., p. 167.

21. Unpublished material prepared by the American Management Association received as a handout from Professor W. H. Church, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

CHAPTER III

METHODS, MATERIAL, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES USED IN CONDUCTING AN OPINION SURVEY

Some of the problems that face a Military Manager in a Joint Military-Civil Service Organization and the conditions under which he works were discussed in Chapter I.

In Chapter II the literature was reviewed on how a manager in any organization deals with the problems of executive development of junior officers, effecting changes in the organization, conflicts between line and staff, decision making, delegation of responsibility, and use of power and authority vs. influence and persuasion. Also reviewed were some of the characteristics of an effective supervisor.

Reason For Making Survey

Since little has been written on the problems of a military manager in a joint military-civil service organization, a questionnaire was developed to obtain information to supplement the information contained in the literature as well as to make comparisons with it. It was considered that any research on these problems as they exist should include a survey on the opinions and perceptions of senior naval officers and senior civil service employees. It was considered to be of interest to compare the opinions of naval officers and civil service employees with the literature reviewed and to investigate the areas of agreement and disagreement between the two groups. Also included in the survey and of primary interest, was a requirement for participants to rank fifteen

characteristics of an effective supervisor in the order of need for improvement for the average CEC junior officer. The ranking by any one individual was not considered to have any great significance since it would be the result of his acquaintances with a few junior officers; however, when all of the rankings were combined they should reflect what the participants perceived to be the supervisory improvement needs of the average CEC junior officer.

Procedures Used in Taking Opinion Survey

The questionnaires were developed using information obtained from three sources: personal interviews with naval officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School; books, periodicals and other literature; and, from my thirteen years experience as a naval officer.

Two separate questionnaires were prepared; one was mailed to senior naval officers and one was mailed to senior civil service employees. The questionnaires were identical except that the officers were required to answer two additional questions (Number 17 and 18). Appendix A contains copies of the questionnaires and forwarding letters.

One-hundred copies of each questionnaire were mailed. The naval officers chosen to participate in this survey were Commanders and Captains in the Civil Engineer Corps (CEC). Their names were picked at random from a list of CEC Officers attached to activities in the continental United States. The civil service employees that participated in the survey were members of activities or departments supervised by CEC Officers. Their rating or grade ranged from Quarterman through Master Mechanic and GS-9 through GS-14. Five copies of the questionnaire

were sent to each of fourteen activities and six copies were sent to each of five activities. The following criteria was used in selecting activities for civil service participation. Activities were chosen throughout the continental United States so that any local or regional influence would have little overall effect and in general each type of activity where CEC Officers are assigned was included.

Three things were done with the intent of improving the number of questionnaires returned. First, the questions were designed for objective type answers so that the participants could complete the questionnaire in a few minutes; second, self addressed envelopes were included with the questionnaires for convenience; and third, the questionnaires for civil service employees were mailed to the CEC Officer that was the head of their activity or department and he was requested to have a civil service employee distribute, collect and mail the questionnaires (see forwarding letter, Appendix A).

Summary

In Chapter I we discussed some of the problems that face a military manager and some of the conditions under which he must work. In Chapter II we reviewed the literature on how a manager in any organization deals with similar problems.

It was considered that any research on management problems that exist in the joint military-civil service organization should include a survey of opinions of naval officers and civil service employees. Therefore, two questionnaires were developed and used for that purpose. It was considered of interest to investigate the areas of agreement and

disagreement not only with the literature reviewed but also between the two groups.

One-hundred copies of each questionnaire were distributed. Officers chosen to participate were Commanders and Captains in the CEC assigned to activities throughout the continental United States. Civil Service employees that participated were Quarterman through Master Mechanics and GS-9 through GS-14 from nineteen activities throughout the continental United States.

CHAPTER IV

RESULT OF QUESTIONNAIRES

The response to the two questionnaires was far above expectations. The officers returned eighty-seven percent while the civil service employees returned eighty-two percent of the questionnaires distributed. Some of the participants did not answer all the questions; however, the size of the sample and number that answered each question was considered sufficient to represent the population sampled.

The exceptionally high participation in the opinion survey is attributed to two things. First, is the way the questionnaires were designed and distributed as discussed in Chapter III and second, most people have definite opinions on the subjects covered and welcome a chance to express their views.

The questionnaires will be reviewed in four parts. First, questions 1-13 and 15-16; second, questions 17 and 18; third, question 14; and fourth, comments received that pertain to the questionnaires in general and not to specific questions.

Questions 1-13 and 15-16

For convenience of review, the questions are reproduced as used in the questionnaire and are followed by the way officers/civilians answered the questions. General comments received on each question have been consolidated and included after each question.

The chi-square test of hypothesis was used to test the difference of opinions of officers and civilians on each question to determine if

they were statistically significant. The null hypothesis used for testing the significance was that the opinions of both officers and civil service employees were the same on each question. Questions on which there was a significant difference of opinion have been annotated by footnotes.

1. Does the rotation of officers every two years reduce the effectiveness of the joint military-civil service organization?

	Yes.	No.
Officers	46	41
Civilians	51	31

Officer comments. Several indicated that the answer to this question would be "no" for lower ranks and "yes" for higher ranks. Some that answered "yes" stated that there are many advantages to this practice. The rotation of Military Managers provides a fresh look at old problems. They have no vested interest and can look at the problems from an objective viewpoint. Several that answered "no" said that three years would be better.

Civilian comments. Concurred with comments of officers above. Generally agreed that three years would be better than two. In two years, an officer barely has time and opportunity to establish changes in procedure, organization and techniques in accordance with his ideas. Also, incompetent civilians stay in their jobs because effective removal action is not completed when supervisor is transferred and the man gets a new start with the next officer. If the tour of duty were three years, the officer would have to live with some of his decisions and would be able to improve them. Also after three years there would be less

possibility of a new officer making major changes, thus eliminating or reducing the usual two-year upheaval and change.

2. With officers rotating every two years, do you think that it is possible for an officer to make improvements in the operation of the organization?

	Yes.	No.	
Officers	82	5	*
Civilians	68	13	

Officer comments. Several qualified their "yes" answer by saying that the amount of improvements he can accomplish in that time is limited. Others said that the amount he can accomplish depends on the officer. An officer can make improvements in two years by using his knowledge, experience and the sound application of management principles.

Civilian comments. Several said "yes" but limited. Some indicated that this causes more problems than anything else. One answered "No - only confusion".

3. What length tour of duty for officers would you consider optimum for efficiency of organization and providing executive development necessary for the officer to assume positions of higher responsibility?

	2 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	Over 4 Yrs.	
Officers	22	60	5	0	****
Civilians	18	37	25	2	

Officer comments. General feeling was that tours should be two years for junior officers up to LCDR and three or four years for LCDR and above. A few stated that it would depend on the billet.

* Significantly different at the .05 level.
**** Significantly different at the .001 level.

Civilian comments. Same as officers comments. Although above numbers indicate the civilians tend more towards four year tours than the officers do.

4. Do you think that changes are sometimes made by incoming officers because of their past methods of operating even though existing methods might be just as effective?

	Yes.	No.
Officers	78	9
Civilians	75	6

No comments by either officers or civilians.

5. For his first assignment, an Ensign in the Civil Engineer Corps should be assigned to a position in a (line, staff, either line or staff) capacity.

	line	staff	either line or staff	
Officers	23	27	34	
Civilians	20	54	7	**

Officer comments. The main point is that he be given some real responsibility whether the job is line or staff. The problem of junior officers in a line or staff position cannot be answered in generalized terms. The answer lies within the individual junior officer in each case. He should be given as much responsibility as he can handle. Thus some fit in a full line capacity and others should never be there.

Junior officers come into the CEC with an excellent technical background, but with little or no experience or training as managers. Junior officers should have some leadership/human relations training before assuming any supervisory billet. He should be experienced enough to recognize the legitimate authorities and responsibilities of his

** Significantly different at the .02 level.

subordinates. He must be able to command respect through his leadership qualities and demonstrated ability.

There are needs and opportunities for junior officers in both line and staff billets. Senior officers should determine the capability of each junior officer and assign him accordingly.

Many junior officers, regardless of their line/staff assignment, generally operate in a staff capacity. In most cases the relationship between them and the senior civilians has been a good one; however, it would go smoother if this relationship were clearly established as a staff assignment.

Civilian comments. Junior officers should not be put into a position where they supervise higher grade civilians. Civil Service qualification standards normally rate Captains with GS-14, Commanders with GS-13, Lieutenant Commanders with GS-12, and Lieutenants with GS-11. An officer should not be placed in a position of responsibility over civil service employees that have a higher comparable rank. Supervision has inherent in itself the obligation and authority to advise, train and guide those they supervise. Each junior officer should be given training in supervision and management and assigned in a staff capacity until he develops the knowledge and ability to fulfill the requirements of a supervisor. Just because an individual is an officer does not automatically make him a supervisor or manager.

6. Do Civil Service employees resent being supervised by officers younger than themselves?

	Yes.	No.	
Officers	51	28	
Civilians	40	40	*

Officer comments. Some said "yes" up through LCDR. Several said that resentment is not because of youth but due to lack of experience, others said that it was caused by the officer's disregard for the civilian's ability and judgement. The majority said that it depended on the education, experience and personality of the individual officer.

Civilian comments. Generally the same as officer comments. If the officer in question is very junior, there is not so much resentment as a feeling of disturbance because he does not possess the maturity and the experience to carry his weight as a supervisor in the organization. If the officer is a senior officer with maturity, who practices sound management principles, the age difference is not material.

7. If the answer to question 6 is yes, how much difference in age can exist before resentment begins to show?

	2 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	10 Yrs.	Over 10 Yrs.
Officers	1	11	20	5
Civilians	3	16	21	4

Officer comments. Same as for question 6.

Civilian comments. Age not considered as important as experience, maturity, education, personality and ability of individual officers.

* Significantly different at the .05 level.

8. What rank would you consider appropriate for a Public Works Officer with a department of 200 employees?

	LT	LCDR	CDR	
Officers	19	56	11	****
Civilians	2	24	54	

Officer comments. Depends on mission of activity.

Civilian comments. Depends on experience and capabilities of individual.

9. What age should the PWO be in the above situation?

	25 Yrs.	30 Yrs.	35 Yrs.	40 Yrs.	
Officers	4	44	31	6	****
Civilians	1	3	34	42	

Officer comments. A few said that age has little to do with performance. Several said that age is not important.

Civilian comments. None.

10. Do junior officers sometimes use power and authority to accomplish desired results when they should use influence and persuasion?

	Yes.	No.
Officers	61	18
Civilians	69	10

Officer comments. Several said that most supervisors, whether military or civilian, are guilty of this. One said, "Who doesn't?"

Civilian comments. A few said that senior officers as well as junior officers are guilty of this.

**** Significantly different at the .001 level.

Junior officers are bright, brash and eager beavers. Some of them are inclined to overlook the fact that intelligent persuasion will accomplish more than a direct order. The eventual realization that even civilians are human, and that he can rely on their mature experience, improves the management relationship and his own personal accomplishment.

The most discouraging situation for an experienced supervisor is to have a junior officer start throwing his weight around, without considering the people or problem involved.

11. If a junior officer in charge of a division has the ability and authority to make all decisions for the division, should he make all the decisions?

	Yes.	No.	
Officers	28	56	
Civilians	14	67	**

Officer comments. None.

Civilian comments. Junior officers are often assigned to a position in a line capacity and receive only minimal supervision and guidance from seniors. In such positions, they feel compelled to render all decisions and are reluctant to delegate authority or rely on experience and capabilities of the civilian organization.

A master mechanic stated that in his twenty-five years of civil service work he had found the majority of officers somewhat unwilling and/or reluctant to make use of the knowledge and experience of civilians at various levels.

** Significantly different at the .02 level.

12. Will an organization be more efficient if personnel within the organization make some of the decisions for which the head of the organization is responsible?

	Yes.	No.
Officers	77	8
Civilians	68	14

Officer comments. Military managers do not give enough consideration to the capabilities and experience of civil service personnel.

Civilian comments. Efficient civilians have ample capability to make decisions within their areas of work. Most of them are better qualified than the military manager, to make decisions in their special field. The military manager should serve primarily as a coordinator and should reserve to his own perogative only those decisions which affect broad policy or many organizational units outside of the civilians sphere of operations. In making a decision, he should lean heavily on the advice of the civilian specialist.

13. Do junior officers consider the military and civilian workforce as a unit?

	Yes.	No.	
Officers	51	26	
Civilians	33	46	***

No comments by either officer or civilian.

15. If the military and civilian workforce is not considered a unit by the supervisor, will organizational efficiency be less?

	Yes.	No.
Officers	75	10
Civilians	74	7

No comments by either officer or civilian.

*** Significantly different at the .005 level.

16. Junior officers have a tendency to delegate (insufficient, enough, too much) work for an efficient organization.

	Insufficient	Enough	Too Much
Officers	56	13	8
Civilians	50	16	8

Officer comments. Delegation is of prime importance in getting the job done, no man is an island in himself and cannot do it all.

Junior officers tend to lean too heavily on anyone that indicates he will do the job. Some consideration must be given to the right man for the job. The lack of proper control procedures tend to create problems for the junior officer. He tends to accept verbal reports and statements as gospel without checking or even applying common sense to the situation. He seems to think that it is a vote of no confidence to follow-up on work assignments. As a result, he frequently assigns work and assumes that it will be done without any further checking. He soon learns that even the best subordinates sometimes fail to accomplish work assignments and/or report progress or lack of progress.

Civilian comments. In general the CEC officer, up through LCDR, is prone not to delegate sufficient authority to the civilian and does not base his decisions sufficiently on the advice of his civilian subordinates.

Question 17 and 18

Questions 17 and 18 were not included in the questionnaire to civil service employees; therefore, the comments and opinions shown are those of senior CEC officers.

17. It has been alleged that Civil Service employees sometimes wait out the transfer of an officer to avoid doing something with which they disagree. Have you ever observed or experienced that situation?

Yes.	No.
68	13

Comment. A few said that this has also been observed in military personnel.

18. Assume that a CEC Officer is to be assigned as a PWO on his fifth tour of duty and you had the opportunity to assign him to duty in his first four tours. What duty assignments and in what order would you assign them in order to develop his executive ability to handle the PWO job and subsequent assignments? (Indicate whether in a line or staff capacity).

Comment. Information received in response to this question has been tabulated on Chart 4-1, page 47.

The tabulation of the replys on this question shows that CEC Captains and Commanders feel that for best executive development and ability to handle subsequent assignments, in his first four tours of duty a junior officer should be assigned duty:

a. In order of importance

1. Public Works
2. Construction Battalion
3. Resident or Assistant Resident Officer in Charge of Construction
4. Bureau Field Division
5. Public Works Center
6. Bureau of Yards and Docks
7. Postgraduate School

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

FOR CEC JUNIOR OFFICERS

Type of Duty	Tours: First	Second	Third	Fourth	Total	
Construction Battalion (Line)	$\boxed{43}$	14	8	3	68	
Resident or Assistant Resident Officer in Charge of Construction (Line)	6	$\boxed{26}$	25	3	60	
Public Works (Line)	9	24	$\boxed{35}$	$\boxed{38}$	106	124
Public Works (Staff)	13	3	2	0	18	
Public Works Center (Staff and Line)	4	4	1	2	11	
Bureau Field Division (Line)	1	1	0	8	10	53
Bureau Field Division (Staff)	6	6	8	23	43	
BuDocks (Staff and Line)	1	2	1	5	9	
Postgraduate School	0	2	2	2	6	

$\boxed{}$ First Choice for Assignment

○ First Alternate for Assignment

CHART 4-1

b. In order of assignment

1. Construction Battalion

2. (2 or 3). Resident or Assistant Resident Officer in Charge of Construction

3. (2,3 or 4). Public Works

4. Bureau Field Division

In general, a junior CEC officer should be assigned to a construction battalion, in a line position for his first tour of duty. If he is assigned to other types of duty, a staff capacity is favored.

For his second tour of duty, he should be assigned to either a construction or public works billet, preferably in a line capacity.

For his third tour of duty, he should be assigned to either public works or a construction billet in a line capacity.

For his fourth tour of duty, he should be assigned to a Bureau Field Division in a staff capacity provided he has been assigned to public works duty in one of his first three tours of duty.

(Note: It is common practice to assign junior officers through Lieutenant to staff positions only in the Bureau Field Divisions.)

Question 14.

Each of the 15 characteristics of an effective supervisor used in question 14 have been given an item number for purposes of identification and use on Chart 4-2.

The overall ranking by officers/civilians is shown beside each characteristic for ease of comparison of the views of officers and civilians. The overall ranking by officers was derived by listing the ranking of each item by each officer and totaling the rank numbers for each item. The total that was smallest was given overall rank number 1, second smallest was given overall rank number 2, etc. The overall ranking by civilians was derived in a similar manner. Therefore, the overall rank of 1 represents what each group considers to be the greatest need for improvement for the average junior CEC officer to become a more effective supervisor.

14. Below are 15 characteristics of an effective supervisor. Considering the average junior CEC Officer as a supervisor, rank each characteristic in the order of greatest need for improvement to the least need for improvement for him to be a more effective supervisor. (Each characteristic should have a different number and they should run from the greatest need (1) to the least need (15)).

Item No.	Overall Ranking By Officers/Civilians	
1	4 / 6	He satisfies employee's desire for recognition.
2	2 / 1	He keeps his employees properly informed.
3	1 / 2	He allows the subordinate to exercise his own discretion and to make as many decisions on his own as he can.
4	14 / 8	He does not invade the bailiwick of the specialist.
5	9 / 5	He keeps his door open for conferences and consultations with his subordinates.
6	8/ 13	He accepts the probability of being unpopular with at least some of his subordinates.

Item No.	Overall Ranking By Officers/Civilians	
7	15 / 12	He is not unduly optimistic about the state of the morale of the employees and other conditions within the organization for which he is responsible.
8	3 / 10	He sees to it that his assistants properly interpret and execute his orders.
9	12 / 11	He tries to obtain changes in regulations which in practice do not achieve their intended results.
10	6 / 4	He accepts the probability that some of his subordinates may be more intelligent or more talented than he is.
11	7 / 9	He will not make promises to his subordinates unless he is sure that he can fulfill them.
12	5 / 3	He will not only expect loyalty from his employees but will also be loyal to them.
13	13 / 14	He neither favors nor discriminates against his personal friends.
14	10 / 5	He will not give in to employees simply because he wearies of the pressures that the latter exert.
15	11 / 7	He should fight in the interests of his subordinates just as hard as his conscience permits.

It is interesting to note the areas of agreement and disagreement between the views of officers and civilians on the various characteristics. The items of greatest variance are 4, 6, 8 and 14. Why was the variance so large on these items? Superior-subordinate biases would affect each item but probably would have more affect on these items. The reasons for the order of ranking were not solicited; however, on the basis of comments received, some of the important considerations were indicated or implied and are listed below with each item.

Item 4 - "He does not invade the bailiwick of the specialist."

The officers probably ranked this item low because (a) the junior officer would not have sufficient knowledge in the specialist's area to influence the specialist's decisions; and, (b) junior officers tend to accept what the specialist says until he develops sufficient knowledge in the area to question his actions or decisions. The civilians probably ranked this item higher because (a) of their resentment to having someone prodding in their special area or even hinting that their work is not beyond reproach; (b) if the junior officer develops a working knowledge in their specialty they might feel that their expert judgment would be questioned; and (c) it requires them to devote time to explaining what they are doing.

Item 6 - "He accepts the probability of being unpopular with at least some of his subordinates."

Officers probably ranked this higher because junior officers tend to make decisions that will make their people happy even though an unpopular decision might be the best for the organization. Civilians probably ranked this item lower because they considered it not much of a problem and subordinates would naturally tend to rank this lower than their superiors would.

Item 8 - "He sees to it that his assistants properly interpret and execute his orders."

Officers probably ranked this item higher because they have observed many instances where junior officers assumed that certain tasks would be carried out without checking and later found this not to be true. The civilians probably ranked this lower because, as subordinates, they resent having their work checked; and, the people that answered the

question feel that they can do their work without having someone looking over their shoulder.

Item 14 - "He will not give in to employees simply because he wearies of the pressure that the latter exert."

Officers that have observed or experienced this situation evidently have not been as disturbed by it as civilians. Subordinates that see an undeserving employee get special treatment simply because he pressures his boss into it, feel that this is unfair to themselves as well as to other employees.

Chart 4-2 was prepared to show the general range of the rankings and is considered to be of more significance than the overall rank numbers. The average ranking was derived by dividing the total of all rank numbers for each item by the number of participants in each group. There were 76 officers and 73 civilians that answered this question.

General Comments Received

The general comments received that did not pertain to a specific question have been grouped and consolidated below.

Officer comments. Young officers should be carefully evaluated on their individual qualifications and skills and assigned according to their ability. They should be advanced and given increasing responsibility as rapidly as they are able to assume such additional responsibility. The training of junior officers to become military managers is a joint responsibility of senior officers and senior civilians. The senior officers should advise the senior civilians of their responsibility and encourage them to live up to it. The junior officer should be placed in

COMPARISON OF OFFICER AND CIVILIAN
AVERAGE RANKING OF IMPROVEMENT NEEDS
OF CEC JUNIOR OFFICERS



CHART 4-2

a line position as soon as he is considered capable. There are too many current and recently retired senior officers who have never had the opportunity to become adequately trained as a supervisor at junior grades, and therefore have given poor performances in executive positions. Young officers are surprisingly qualified and capable of doing the job if given the chance and given some assistance and guidance by their seniors. Also, every effort should be made to provide CEC officers with some formal management training early in their career.

The civilian is just as important. He provides continuity and far greater knowledge of the activity. We need to develop our civilian talent just as much as we do our junior officers. To do so we must weed out the culls and replace them with supervisors who display initiative, intelligence, and a reasonable degree of dedication to their job.

Both the military and civilian supervisor should be given opportunities and encouragement for professional growth. They should be trained to work together to attain common goals. The senior man in an organization must realize that individuals differ, both military and civilian, and he must take these differences into consideration and run his organization accordingly.

The greatest contribution a CEC officer can make to a command is to acquire a thorough understanding of the Navy's mission and the role which his command serves and use this knowledge to guide his efforts in his job.

Below are some suggestions offered to junior officers.

a. Don't be embarrassed to ask questions.

b. Seek out and accept complete responsibility, don't be afraid to get your hands dirty.

c. Improve your letter writing ability.

d. Keep the boss informed.

e. You do not have to accept mediocre or substandard performances from subordinates.

f. Regulations should be followed. If they are wrong or inadequate they should be changed.

g. Be mindful of military and civilian courtesies.

Civilian comments. The effectiveness of a manager depends on the individual and it makes little difference as to whether he is military or civilian. Military managers who have had experience in non-military areas are usually better managers than those with only a military background.

It was recommended that, wherever possible, the second in command be a civilian so as to provide better continuity.

Working in a combined military-civilian organization requires that personnel in both categories accept certain conditions which can (and generally do) arise as a result of the established relationship. Normally, the department head and his assistant are officers of the military establishment whereas the next level of management and a majority, at least, of productive personnel are civilian. Generally speaking, it is believed that this situation does not create any ill-feeling or resentment on either side. On the other hand, it is believed that military personnel should delegate authority to the lower (division) levels consistant with good management practices and in consideration of the capabilities of the individual. Since these decisions are subject to review by the department head, the military more or less automatically retains control over the operation. On the other hand, decisions made by the military which are

not passed to the lower echelons of management can create varied amounts of confusion. Similarly, the retention of "decision making" at the department head level destroys much the continuity normally provided by a well-advised civilian organization.

With more particular reference to the above questions, it is believed that junior officers (at least at the Ensign and Lieutenant, j.g. level) should be placed in staff positions until experience can be gained in both the operation and management functions. Management decisions normally involve some reference to past experience, and until the junior officer has an understanding of the operation, he is not adequately equipped to actively supervise in those areas requiring knowledge other than that of a technical nature which may be referred to a "text book" decision. The combined military-civilian operation is a two way street in which both segments should fully understand the need for cooperative effort rather than autocratic direction.

Officers should not condone poor performance, poor attendance, drunkedness and similar conduct by not taking disciplinary action, and then issuing routine "satisfactory" ratings for people they rate regardless of how they have handled their jobs. A word of appreciation, even when there is no opportunity for other recognition, can do wonders for the morale of people who are conscientious and trying to do an honest days work every day.

There is an urgent need for military managers to recognize:

a. Responsible attitudes of senior civilians.

b. Professional status of key employees.

c. Importance of trust, confidence and prompt communication with senior civilians.

d. Civilian supervisors should not be by-passed in making work assignments.

e. Strong points in civilians to bolster their weak points.

f. The futility of using military command perogatives indiscriminately.

g. The danger of "bluffing" or "covering up" lack of knowledge or experience to key civilians in lieu of admitting the need for indoctrination and professional assistance.

h. The stupidity of constant criticism, "Give 'em hell" and "Keep 'em on their toes" philosophy on the part of any military manager.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The military manager in a joint military-civil service organization is faced with many problems. He must handle the same problems that face any manager as well as several special problems that are unique to his organization. He manages his military personnel under one system and his civil service personnel under a different system. Whenever two different groups with similar functions are working side by side in the same organization, friction and competition for power, prestige and recognition will develop. In order to have an efficient organization, the military manager must integrate the two groups into a working entity. He must strive to develop mutual understanding, trust and confidence between the two groups. This task is made more difficult by his being rotated frequently to a new assignment.

The rotation of officers has advantages as well as disadvantages; however, the present average length of tour is considered to be too short for either efficient management or effective training. The officer does not have sufficient time to learn his new assignment and the capabilities of his personnel before he is moved to his next assignment. The civil servants are required to maintain continuity in the organization; however, this task is extremely difficult when the people to whom they report are continually changing.

Changes are required in any organization so that it can keep pace with progress. The joint military-civil service organization is no exception. With the top managers changing frequently and each one having

a different idea as to how the organization should be run, the organization is kept pretty turbulent. We learned in the survey that many officers make changes simply because of past methods of operation even though present methods might be just as effective. Before initiating a change the manager should determine whether any change should be made; the change planned is proper; and, if the timing is right for the change. It is natural for people to resist changes when they do not agree with, or understand the reason for, the change. Managers should consider the effect of any change on the individual as well as the organization as a whole. One factor that sometimes complicates the changes made by a military manager is the assignment of junior officers in the organization.

The role of the junior officer in the joint organization is one of concern to both military and civilian supervisors. In order for him to develop the capability to assume positions of high responsibility in the hierarchy, he must learn how the organization functions, develop the ability to make good decisions, gain acceptance of his decisions, and obtain experience in handling supervisory problems. He may be placed in either a line or staff position. He can obtain valuable training in each, but sooner or later he must have experience in a line position.

In Chapter II we learned that in order for an officer to become an effective supervisor he must develop the ability to: analyze the desires, motives and goals of individuals and groups; communicate effectively with subordinates, peers and superiors; and, motivate individuals and groups to accomplish organizational goals. He should be aware that informal organizations exist in any organization and should use these informal

groups to accomplish organizational goals whenever possible. Also, he must develop the ability to make good decisions.

Decision making is a primary function of any manager; however, he should not make all the decisions for his organization. He should get participation from his subordinates and in many cases, should delegate the authority for making decisions to capable subordinate supervisors.

The military manager should strive to develop an atmosphere in the organization that will encourage individual development and efficiency. He should assume his duties with tact, firmness, fairness, and a healthy attitude to perform to the best of his ability while at the same time maximizing the use of the talents of those working for him.

Discussion and Conclusion of Questionnaires

In response to the question on the optimum length tour of duty for both efficiency of organizations and providing executive development for the officer, the average response for the officers was 2.8 years and for the civilians 3.2 years. If you were to combine their viewpoints then you could conclude that a three year tour of duty for officers would produce better results than the normal two year tour.

The officers and civilians agreed in general on the assignment of junior officers. Each individual is different and assignment should be made on the basis of maturity, personality, experience and ability of the individual. Every junior officer should have some management training early in his career. He should be placed in a staff capacity until he develops the knowledge and ability to fulfill the requirements of a supervisor. The main point is that he be given some real responsibility

whether in a line or staff capacity. He should be advanced and given additional responsibility as rapidly as he is able to assume such additional responsibility. The training of junior officers to become military managers is the joint responsibility of senior officers and senior civilians.

The civilian supervisor is just as important and he should receive the same attention and encouragement for self improvement as the junior officer receives. He provides continuity and important knowledge of the activity. Both the military and civilian supervisor should be given opportunities for professional growth and should be trained to work together to attain common goals.

Working in a combined military-civilian organization requires that personnel in both categories accept certain conditions which can, and generally do, arise as a result of the established relationship. Military managers should delegate authority to lower levels consistent with good management practices and in consideration of the capabilities of the individual. Since these decisions are subject to review by the military manager, he retains control over them. On the other hand, decisions made by the military manager which are not passed to the the lower echelons of management can create varied amounts of confusion. Similarly, the retention of "decision making" at the military manager level destroys much of the continuity normally provided by a well advised civilian organization.

Recommended Revisions For Future Questionnaires

The quantity of completed questionnaires returned was very gratifying; however, more valuable information could probably have been obtained with

modified questions. I think that questions 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 13, and 17 should have been designed with a choice of answers over a range rather than a simple yes or no. For example, question number 2 could be revised as follows: With an officer rotating every two years, I think that it is possible for him to make _____ improvements in the operation of his organization.

major |_|_|_✓_|_|_|_|_| no

Several people indicated that they did not know what an <u>average</u> junior officer was and, therefore had difficulty in completing question 14. Others said that they would not put much faith in the answers they gave for that question. These comments were expected and I did not consider the rating by any one individual to be of any great significance as discussed in Chapter III. I believe that it would have been easier for individuals to rank the 15 characteristics of an effective supervisor in order of importance for junior officers rather than the way required on the questionnaire.

Essay type questions were not included because they require more time and tend to reduce participation. However the general comments received were considered excellent and indicate that the inclusion of a few essay type questions would have been profitable.

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APPENDIX A

Box 1396
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
31 March 1965

I am writing a research paper on "Military Managers in the Joint Military-Civil Service Organization" as part of my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. The areas of interest are (a) the problems that develop between the military and civil service, (b) the problems that develop when a junior officer is put in charge of older, experienced civil service personnel, (c) reasons for assignment of junior officers to a line billet vs. staff billet, and (d) how executive development of junior officers is accomplished.

The results of this study should assist junior officers in better understanding the problems they will encounter in a joint military-civil service organization and should provide them with knowledge of methods and techniques that have been used successfully in solving problems.

I would appreciate your taking a few minutes from your busy schedule to complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me. A self addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Very respectfully,

RAYMOND E. PAULSEN
LCDR, CEC, USN

Please answer the following questions on the basis of your own observation and/or personal experience. Circle the best answer or fill in the blank as appropriate.

1. Does the rotation of officers every two years reduce the effectiveness of the joint military-civil service organization?
   Yes. No.

2. With officers rotating every two years, do you think that it is possible for an officer to make improvements in the operation of the organization? Yes. No.

3. What length tour of duty for officers would you consider optimum for efficiency of organization and providing executive development necessary for the officer to assume positions of higher responsibility? 2 Yrs. 3 Yrs. 4 Yrs. _____ Yrs.

4. Do you think that changes are sometimes made by incoming officers because of their past methods of operating even though existing methods might be just as effective? Yes. No.

5. For his first assignment, an Ensign in the Civil Engineer Corps should be assigned to a position in a (line, staff, either line or staff) capacity.

6. Do Civil Service employees resent being supervised by officers younger than themselves? Yes. No.

7. If the answer to question 6 is yes, how much difference in age can exist before resentment begins to show? 2 Yrs. 5 Yrs. 10 Yrs. _____ Yrs.

8. What rank would you consider appropriate for a Public Works Officer with a department of 200 employees? LT LCDR CDR

9. What age should the PWO be in the above situation?
   25 Yrs. 30 Yrs. 35 Yrs. 40 Yrs.

10. Do junior officers sometimes use power and authority to accomplish desired results when they should use influence and persuasion?
    Yes. No.

11. If a junior officer in charge of a division has the ability and authority to make all decisions for the division, should he make all the decisions? Yes. No.

12. Will an organization be more efficient if personnel within the organization make some of the decisions for which the head of the organization is responsible? Yes. No.

13. Do junior officers consider the military and civilian workforce as a unit? Yes. No.

14. Below are 15 characteristics of an effective supervisor. Considering the average junior CEC Officer as a supervisor, rank each characteristic in the order of greatest need for improvement to the least need for improvement for him to be a more effective supervisor. (Each characteristic should have a different number and they should run from the greatest need (1) to the least need (15)).

_____ He satisfies employee's desire for recognition.

_____ He keeps his employees properly informed.

_____ He allows the subordinate to exercise his own discretion and to make as many decisions on his own as he can.

_____ He does not invade the bailiwick of the specialist.

_____ He keeps his door open for conferences and consultations with his subordinates.

_____ He accepts the probability of being unpopular with at least some of his subordinates.

_____ He is not unduly optimistic about the state of the morale of the employees and other conditions within the organization for which he is responsible.

_____ He sees to it that his assistants properly interpret and execute his orders.

_____ He tries to obtain changes in regulations which in practice do not achieve their intended results.

_____ He accepts the probability that some of his subordinates may be more intelligent or more talented than he is.

_____ He will not make promises to his subordinates unless he is sure that he can fulfill them.

_____ He will not only expect loyalty from his employees but will also be loyal to them.

_____ He neither favors nor discriminates against his personal friends.

_____ He will not give in to employees simply because he wearies of the pressure that the latter exert.

_____ He should fight in the interests of his subordinates just as hard as his conscience permits.

15. If the military and civilian workforce is not considered a unit by the supervisor, will organizational efficiency be less?
Yes. No.

16. Junior officers have a tendency to delegate (insufficient, enough, too much) work for an efficient organization.

17. It has been alleged that Civil Service employees sometimes wait out the transfer of an officer to avoid doing something with which they disagree. Have you ever observed or experienced that situation? Yes. No.

18. Assume that a CEC Officer is to be assigned as a PWO on his fifth tour of duty and you had the opportunity to assign him to duty in his first four tours. What duty assignments and in what order would you assign them in order to develop his executive ability to handle the PWO job and subsequent assignments? (Indicate whether in a line or staff capacity).

1.
2.
3.
4.

Please add any comments you may have on Military Managers in the Joint Military-Civil Service Organization.

Rank of Officer completing form _____

Box 1396
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
31 March 1965

I am writing a research paper on "Military Managers in the Joint Military-Civil Service Organization" as part of my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. The areas of interest are (a) the problems that develop between the military and civil service, (b) the problems that develop when a junior officer is put in charge of older, experienced civil service personnel, (c) reasons for assignment of junior officers to a line billet vs. staff billet, and (d) how executive development of junior officers is accomplished.

The results of this study should assist junior officers in better understanding the problems they will encounter in a joint military-civil service organization and should provide them with knowledge of methods and techniques that have been used successfully in solving problems.

I would appreciate your having the enclosed questionnaires filled out by some of your senior civil service employees. More meaningful results would probably be obtained if the questionnaires were distributed, collected and mailed by a civil service employee (possibly the head of your Administrative Branch). Personnel are more likely to express their true feelings in some areas if the military in their organization do not have the opportunity to scan their comments.

The questionnaires have been designed to require a minimum amount of time to complete and enclosed is a self addressed envelope for use in returning them.

Very respectfully,

RAYMOND E. PAULSEN
LCDR, CEC, USN

Please answer the following questions on the basis of your own observation and/or personal experience. Circle the best answer or fill in the blank as appropriate.

1. Does the rotation of officers every two years reduce the effectiveness of the joint military-civil service organization?
   Yes. No.

2. With officers rotating every two years, do you think that it is possible for an officer to make improvements in the operation of the organization? Yes. No.

3. What length tour of duty for officers would you consider optimum for efficiency of organization and providing executive development necessary for the officer to assume positions of higher responsibility? 2 Yrs. 3 Yrs. 4 Yrs. _____ Yrs.

4. Do you think that changes are sometimes made by incoming officers because of their past methods of operating even though existing methods might be just as effective? Yes. No.

5. For his first assignment, an Ensign in the Civil Engineer Corps should be assigned to a position in a (line, staff, either line or staff) capacity.

6. Do Civil Service employees resent being supervised by officers younger than themselves? Yes. No.

7. If the answer to question 6 is yes, how much difference in age can exist before resentment begins to show? 2 Yrs. 5 Yrs. 10 Yrs. _____ Yrs.

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    Yes. No.

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_____ He keeps his employees properly informed.

_____ He allows the subordinate to exercise his own discretion and to make as many decisions on his own as he can.

_____ He does not invade the bailiwick of the specialist.

_____ He keeps his door open for conferences and consultations with his subordinates.

_____ He accepts the probability of being unpopular with at least some of his subordinates.

_____ He is not unduly optimistic about the state of the morale of the employees and other conditions within the organization for which he is responsible.

_____ He sees to it that his assistants properly interpret and execute his orders.

_____ He tries to obtain changes in regulations which in practice do not achieve their intended results.

_____ He accepts the probability that some of his subordinates may be more intelligent or more talented than he is.

_____ He will not make promises to his subordinates unless he is sure that he can fulfill them.

_____ He will not only expect loyalty from his employees but will also be loyal to them.

_____ He neither favors nor discriminates against his personal friends.

_____ He will not give in to employees simply because he wearies of the pressure that the latter exert.

_____ He should fight in the interests of his subordinates just as hard as his conscience permits.

15. If the military and civilian workforce is not considered a unit by the supervisor, will organizational efficiency be less?
Yes. No.

16. Junior officers have a tendency to delegate (insufficient, enough, too much) work for an efficient organization.

Please add any comments you may have on Military Managers in the Joint Military-Civil Service Organization.

Rating or grade of person completing form _____

thesP2721
Military managers in the joint military-
3 2768 001 98090 7
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